"U.S. Household Deficit Spending: A Rendezvous with Reality" by Robert W. Parenteau
U.S.HOUSEHOLD
DEFICIT SPENDING 
A Rendezvous with Reality
robert w. parenteau
Public Policy Brief
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
No. 88, 2006Public Policy Brief
U.S.HOUSEHOLD
DEFICIT SPENDING
A Rendezvous with Reality
robert w. parenteauThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is an autonomous research organization.
It is nonpartisan, open to the examination of diverse points of view, and dedicated to public service.
The Institute is publishing this research with the conviction that it is a constructive and positive contribution
to discussions and debates on relevant policy issues. Neither the Institute’s Board of Governors nor its
advisers necessarily endorse any proposal made by the author.
The Institute believes in the potential for the study of economics to improve the human condition.
Through scholarship and research it generates viable, effective public policy responses to important 
economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States and abroad.
The present research agenda includes such issues as financial instability, poverty, employment, gender,
problems associated with the distribution of income and wealth, and international trade and competitive-
ness. In all its endeavors, the Institute places heavy emphasis on the values of personal freedom and justice.
Editor: W. Ray Towle
Text Editor: René Houtrides
The Public Policy Brief Series is a publication of The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College,Blithewood,
PO Box 5000, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000. For information about the Levy Institute and to
order Public Policy Briefs, call 845-758-7700 or 202-887-8464 (in Washington, D.C.), e-mail info@levy.org,
or visit the Levy Institute website at www.levy.org.
The Public Policy Brief Series is produced by the Bard Publications Office.
Copyright © 2006 by The Levy Economics Institute.All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic or mechanical,including photocopying,
recording, or any information-retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
ISSN 1063-5297
ISBN 1-931493-58-8Preface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
U.S.Household Deficit Spending  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Robert W. Parenteau
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
ContentsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
Preface
Over the past decade,deficit spending by U.S.households has supported the
U.S. economy. Research Associate Robert W. Parenteau analyzes the finan-
cial balance of U.S.households and finds that the pace of deficit spending is
likely to stall and,possibly,reverse course.This reversion will jeopardize U.S.
profit and economic growth, as well as the growth of countries dependent
on export-led development strategies. His research supports the position of
other Levy Institute scholars who have urged policymakers to recognize the
consequences of current imbalances in the U.S. economy.
Parenteau observes that the U.S. household financial balance has been
deteriorating since 1997 and that the rate of decay has accelerated since early
2005.Although persistently increasing private sector deficits can be sustained,
the conditions for avoiding debt-trap dynamics no longer exist.What may
be happening in the U.S. household sector, says Parenteau, is what the late
economist Hyman P. Minsky would recognize as a form of Ponzi finance.
Since the primary financial surplus is exhausted, and income growth is
below the average interest rate paid on household debt,household borrow-
ing against the value of existing assets is required to sustain rampant deficit
spending and to service prior debt commitments. Thus, household deficit
spending is predicated on sustaining asset bubbles. However, we may soon
enter a period of home price deflation and declining household spending,
which would have profound implications for export-led economies.
The gap between personal saving and the acquisition of net financial
assets has to do with massive mortgage equity withdrawals.The household
gross savings rate has overshot to the downside,irrespective of the elevated
ratio of net worth to disposable income. Even under very favorable
assumptions for income growth and household net worth appreciation,the
implied rate of real consumer spending will drop at a rate that is rarely seen
outside of recessions.6 Public Policy Brief, No. 88
Debt-trap equations are rarely applied to private sector deficit spend-
ing.When the equations are applied to the U.S.household sector,there is an
explosive household debt-to-income trajectory that can only be sustained
by an equally explosive appreciation of asset prices that lifts them far from
their fundamental values.
Parenteau’s review of key lines of credit extended to the U.S.household
sector shows a noticeable slowdown, which is a demand-side response to
slower home price appreciation. Furthermore, credit restrictions have yet
to appear on the scene, so a credit crunch could sharply curtail household
credit growth and force a dramatic reversal of household deficit spending.
A rendezvous with reality for U.S. household financial imbalances appears
to have arrived, he says.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President 
November 2006As of the first quarter of 2006, the gap between household sector expendi-
ture and income in the United States widened to an annualized deficit of
approximately $600 billion.1 The deterioration in the household financial
balance has been going on since 1997,and the rate of decay has accelerated
noticeably since early 2005 (Figure 1). The household sector financial bal-
ance has been plunging.
While many economists decry government deficit spending, they turn
a blind eye toward private sector deficit spending. Contemporary econo-
mists are trained to view household spending decisions as the aggregation
of millions of individual budgeting decisions based on intertemporal util-
ity calculations; these calculations, by definition, must produce rational
consumption paths over time. The dramatic deepening of household
deficit spending—the gap between household income and expenditures or,
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alternatively, household saving minus investment—suggests that this view
of household spending decisions may be a bit too complacent.
What Is Sustainable? The Apparent Necessity of 
Serial Asset Bubbles
A popular view among bearishly predisposed economists, on the other
hand,claims that such financial imbalances are clearly unsustainable.After
nearly a decade of unprecedented U.S. household deficit spending, this
claim has worn a little thin, but the arithmetic of debt-sustainability con-
ditions has been available for more than six decades—at least since the work
Evsey Domar did on government-debt dynamics,during the time he was at
the Federal Reserve (Fed).2
Borrowing from government sector or third world debt-trap equa-
tions, we know it is possible that persistently increasing private sector
deficits can be sustained under at least three conditions.First,the long-run
growth of private sector income must exceed the average interest rate on
the debt owed by the sector.This is a necessary condition for avoiding debt-


















Figure 2 Key Elements in the Household Debt-Trap Equation 
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1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 share of income. Second, the private sector may be deficit spending, but its
primary financial balance—excluding interest expense—must be in suffi-
cient surplus. With a primary financial surplus, income grows more than
noninterest expenditures, so there is still a positive cash flow cushion before
debt servicing. Less new debt must be issued to service prior liabilities.
Third, if assets held by the private sector continue to appreciate in price at
a sufficient rate, then it is possible that the growth in collateral values and
capital gains will be sufficient to service existing debts and justify further
lending, even to a sector that is rampantly deficit-spending.3
As a check of the first sustainability condition,it is possible to construct
an imputed average interest rate for the U.S. household sector by dividing
household interest expenditures by outstanding household debt (Figure 2).
This can then be compared with the growth of disposable (that is, after-
tax) personal income calculated on a five-year trailing average basis.We use
a five-year trailing income growth on the assumption that the experience
of income growth over the recent past is what borrowers use when they
assess their ability to take on more debt, and, similarly, what lenders use
when they assess debt-servicing capabilities. This assumption may be too
stringent, in light of the proliferation in recent years of no-documentation
mortgage loans, or so-called “liar loans,” based on stated income that may
bear no relation to actual income.
However, this comparison is not entirely kosher, as we should also be
using an after-tax estimate of the average interest rate, which would shift
the entire interest rate profile down,given a roughly 20–22 percent average
federal tax rate over the period. Nevertheless, as a crude first cut, the com-
parison is unlikely to be off base.
What we find is that one crucial condition for avoiding debt-trap
dynamics—income growth in excess of interest rates—has been consis-
tently violated since the Volcker interest rate shock. Explosive debt-trap
dynamics (i.e., an exponential increase in the household debt-to-income
ratio) are implied by the gap between interest rates and income growth in
the household sector (Figure 3).
After a period of relative stability from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s,
the household debt-to-income ratio has persistently risen, and it has risen
at an accelerating rate over the past half decade. An explosive household
debt-to-income trajectory is more than an algebraic possibility.















Figure 3 Household Debt-to-Income Ratio
Source: Federal Reserve Board 
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This means that the sustainability of U.S. household deficit spending
has been highly dependent upon either the maintenance of a primary
financial surplus or the perpetual and rapid appreciation of asset prices,
especially in the key asset classes held by U.S. households.
If we add money-interest expense back into our measure of the house-
hold sector financial balance, the primary financial balance reflects a sur-
plus for most of the past half century (Figure 4). In fact, the household
primary surplus peaked in 1982 at 12 percent of nominal GDP and fell to
3.8 percent at the height of the New Economy bubble in 1999.The primary
household financial balance was in a surplus of 1.2 percent of GDP in 2005.
If the current Fed flow of funds data for the U.S.household sector is indica-
tive of the likely full-year outcome, the odds are that the primary financial
balance is barely in a surplus position. This means that the prior cushion
against an explosive household debt-to-income trajectory has recently
been exhausted.
These results leave households with one last loophole to escape from
the eventual constraints of explosive debt-trap dynamics—namely, suffi-
cient and sustained appreciation in the assets they hold. But given the
recent erosion of the primary financial surplus and the lingering gap
between average interest rates and long-run income growth of the house-
hold sector, the required degree of asset price appreciation has undoubt-
edly risen in recent years. To achieve a rate of asset price appreciation high
enough to sustain (or deepen) household deficit spending, asset prices will
have to increasingly depart from fundamentals (like earnings growth or
dividend payouts from equities or rental income from real estate) that are
unlikely to grow as quickly,given normal macroeconomic or monetary and
fiscal policy constraints. When asset prices diverge from fundamentals,
asset bubbles emerge. On the analysis presented above, serial asset bubbles
will need to be engineered in order to keep household deficit spending on
a steep trajectory.
A Rendezvous with Reality: Some Implications
In other words,the U.S.household sector may be engaging in what the late
economist Hyman P. Minsky would recognize as a form of Ponzi finance.12 Public Policy Brief, No. 88
Since the primary financial surplus is exhausted, and household income
growth is below the average interest rate paid on household debt, house-
hold borrowing against the value of existing assets is required to sustain
rampant deficit spending and to service prior debt commitments (princi-
pal and interest). Without a suitable and swift “euthanasia of the rentier,”4
such that interest rates fall below long-run household income growth, sus-
taining U.S. household deficit spending is predicated on sustaining asset
bubbles.
In the New Economy bubble, rapid equity price appreciation sup-
ported the onset of U.S. household deficit spending. After the equity bub-
ble burst, household deficit spending was supported by large multiyear tax
cuts, which buttressed after-tax income growth, and rapid price apprecia-
tion of residential real estate, as the Fed lowered its funds rate to 1 percent
and mortgage rates dropped to lifetime lows for most households.
At the moment, house price appreciation has cooled considerably. On
a year-to-year basis, we have just entered a period of new and existing
house price deflation (falling absolute price levels for residential real estate in
the aggregate). The rallies in U.S. equity prices and U.S. bonds are unlikely
to produce sufficient wealth effects for U.S. households.5
If asset price appreciation remains subdued or erodes,it stands to reason
that household spending growth will decline toward household income
growth. Real disposable income growth is currently in the range of 2.5 to 3
percent on a year-to-year basis, while personal consumption expenditure
growth had previously increased in the range of 3.5 to 4 percent. If the
above analysis is correct, that pace of consumer spending is no longer pos-
sible unless,of course,sufficiently strong bubble dynamics can be regenerated
in assets held by households.
The downshift in U.S. consumer spending has profound implications
for export-led economies.Brazil,Russia,India,and China (i.e.,BRIC coun-
tries) whose markets were expected to grow to the sky, and whose assets
were valued accordingly,may confound expectations.The downshift would
have substantial consequences for professional investors who have waded
into commodity markets over the past two to three years, since U.S. con-
sumer spending is roughly 20 percent of global GDP.In contrast,Japan and
Germany,the next two nations with the highest consumer-spending sharesThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
of global GDP, tend to run trade surpluses (i.e., they are net suppliers of
goods and services to the rest of the world).
Relevant Counterviews
Two counterviews to the above analysis, popular among some Wall Street
economists, are worth examining.
First Counterview
The first counterview is that U.S. households have acquired net financial
assets at a pace that well exceeds personal savings out of income flows. The
conclusion drawn from this observation is that household saving must be
much larger than reported.Otherwise,such a strong pace of financial asset
accumulation could not have been maintained. Therefore, any measure of
the household financial balance that is based on erroneous personal saving
measures must be biased to the downside.
A problem of macroeconomic coherency arises with this view.
Financial balances must balance at the aggregate level. If one sector is run-
ning a large financial surplus or net saving position,another sector must be
running an offsetting financial deficit position. If household savings are as
large as this counterview asserts, then the financial balance approach
requires that some combination of the following must also be true:
•  Corporate free cash flow is much lower than currently reported
•  The trade deficit is not nearly as bad as currently reported
•  The fiscal deficit is much deeper than currently reported
It is unreasonable simply to assert that one piece of a puzzle is faulty
without presenting evidence that the adjoining pieces are also faulty. And
remember, we are talking about a distortion on the order of $1 trillion per
year in the three adjoining puzzle pieces bulleted above (i.e.,the average net
acquisition of financial assets by households over the past three years).
Advocates of the view that personal saving is grossly underreported need to
remember that sectoral financial balances must balance in the aggregate.
It is true that the pace of net financial asset acquisitions by U.S.house-
holds has well exceeded the flow of personal saving. In fact, this divergence
has been the case for most of the past half century; but it has become par-
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Figure 5 Household Saving Does Not Constrain the Acquisition 
of Financial Assets
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Figure 6 The Household Sector Can Borrow to Accumulate 
Financial Assets
Household Sector Net Acquisition of Financial Assets 
Household Mortgage Debt 
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The personal saving flow is now negative, which would seem to imply that
households are in no position to accumulate financial assets.
There are, however, two ways to acquire financial assets: (1) out of
household saving flows (i.e., income flows that are not spent on consumer
goods and services); and (2) by borrowing in order to “make position,” as
Minsky called it. The household sector as a whole has been borrowing and
accumulating financial assets with the proceeds. Consequently, it makes
perfect sense that the period with the maximum divergence between per-
sonal saving flows and net financial asset acquisitions by households is also
the period with the most rapid increase in household liabilities, particularly
mortgage debt (Figure 6).
We can triangulate this issue from yet another direction.The change in
the level of household debt outstanding can be compared with the average
household financial balance over the past four quarters. If household debt
is increasing more than the amount required to plug the gap between
household income and expenditures—the household financial balance—we
can infer that household debt is being used for other purposes; namely, the
acquisition of financial assets.
Household debt has increased well in excess of the amount required to
plug the gap between household income and expenditures (Figure 7). The
household financial balance has averaged $564 billion over the past four
quarters, while the total increase in household sector liabilities has been
$1,204 billion. The household sector has been increasing its acquisition of
financial assets by issuing debt, and so the flow of personal saving has not
constrained the acquisition of financial assets by the household sector.
In what form might the leveraging of household portfolios have taken
place? We know that extracting mortgage equity from real estate holdings
became an easy and popular financial practice in U.S. households over the
past six years.Also,as previously mentioned,the increase in household lia-
bilities came mostly through rising mortgage debt. On the asset side of the
household balance sheet, the majority of financial asset acquisitions
occurred via time and savings deposits (Figure 8).
These observations all cohere. When individuals execute an equity
cash-out mortgage refinancing,their mortgage liabilities increase and they are
credited with an increase in the cash balance of their bank account.Perhaps
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Figure 8 Households Built-up Time and Saving Deposit Holdings
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account.Regardless,the surge in net financial assets tells us only that house-
holds have acquired financial assets—primarily bank deposits—by issuing
liabilities against their nonfinancial (namely, real estate) asset holdings.
Households have been “monetizing”their real estate holdings without hav-
ing to sell or liquidate them, and acquiring time and saving deposits with
the proceeds. Bank loans, after all, create bank deposits.
The gap between personal saving and the acquisition of net financial
assets by households has everything to do with massive mortgage-equity
withdrawals over the past half decade. The gap is not the result of a gross
mismeasurement of personal saving, and the acquisition of net financial
assets cannot be treated as a better measure of household saving out of
income flows.
Second Counterview  
The second and more valid counterview has to do with the rebuilding of
household net worth, since the bursting of the New Economy bubble. The
essence of this counterview is that by focusing simply on the liability side of
household balance sheets, bearishly inclined economists are bound to come
away with a distorted picture.In fact,household net worth,scaled by personal
after-tax income, has again approached the New Economy bubble highs.
On this basis, it is argued that households have sufficient equity cushions
in their portfolios,not only to weather any storm,but to continue deepening
the pace of deficit spending,should their intertemporal utility-maximization
exercises lead them to conclude that this is the best path to pursue.
Some economists at the Fed and elsewhere have argued that the key
signal encouraging households to borrow and deficit spend has been the
persistently strong and positive labor productivity shocks that raise con-
sumer expectations of robust, real, personal income growth rates in the
future. This argument has been made throughout the past half decade,
despite a decline in the trailing five-year real disposable income growth rate
(from a 4.2 percent peak in the third quarter of 2000 to 2.6 percent in the
second quarter of 2006) that has recently approached the lows of the early
1990s credit-headwind experience, and the lows of the double-dip episode
of 1979–82.
Two challenges arise to the view that household net worth provides a
reliable cushion for continued deficit spending by U.S.households:the first18 Public Policy Brief, No. 88
pertains to the relationship between net worth and the gross savings rate
(which is already far from the historical norm); the second results from the
tendency of lenders to form risk perceptions in a procyclical fashion.
First, households tend to view increases in net worth from asset-price
appreciation as a substitute for saving out of income flows. Either way—
capital gains or saving out of income flows—household wealth holdings
increase.This is,after all,the basis of wealth effects on the propensity to con-
sume out of household income flows. It holds true empirically (Figure 9).
However, even if household net worth is assumed to grow exactly in
line with income from now on, so that the U.S. household net worth-to-
disposable income ratio stays on a “permanently high plateau,” as des-
cribed by Irving Fisher’s deadly call on the stock market in 1929, there is a
slight problem.
Using historical observations, it is possible to run a line of best fit
between the household net worth ratio and the personal saving rate (Figure
10).The regression shows that the household gross saving rate has overshot
to the downside, even at the current elevated net worth-to-disposable
income ratio. History suggests that the saving rate should be close to 2.5
Figure 9 The Gross Personal Saving Rate Varies Inversely with the
Household Net Worth-to-Disposable Personal Income Ratio
Household Net Worth-to-Disposable Personal Income Ratio (left-hand scale) 
Household Gross Saving Rate (right-hand scale) 
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percent, when the ratio of household net worth to disposable personal
income is at 5.6, as was the case in the first quarter of 2006. The latest read-
ing for the saving rate is minus 0.5 percent.
Smooth Transition?
Let’s make two very generous assumptions: the ratio of net worth to dis-
posable income stays constant for the next year, and the nominal growth
rate of household disposable income remains steady at 4.5 percent. If the
gross rate of household saving migrates back to 2.5 percent—where it
should be already, as argued above—what is the implied rate of consumer
spending in one year? 
If we are to get the necessary adjustment in the gross rate of household
saving, nominal personal outlays can advance only at a 1.4 percent pace
over the year ending in August 2007. This means very low revenue growth
over the next year for companies that sell to U.S. consumers. It implies a
real consumer spending drop, on the order of 1.0 to 1.5 percent, assuming
generous inflation relief over the next year—a pace rarely seen outside of
Figure 10 Is the Personal Saving Rate in Line with the
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recession. Keep in mind that this spending response is predicated on very
favorable assumptions for income growth and household net worth appre-
ciation—this is not a deck stacked to give a downside-risk result.
Clearly, on this score, the high net worth argument is no panacea for
the adjustment of household deficit spending. The gross saving rate has
already overshot to the downside and,even under fairly optimistic assump-
tions, U.S. consumer spending would not grow if the existing overshoot
were to be corrected.
Or Not So Smooth Transition?
Banks and other creditors consistently reveal procyclical risk perceptions
and risk preferences. Criteria for creditworthiness have a tendency to
loosen over the course of business cycle expansions, as recent favorable
credit seasoning experiences are extrapolated indefinitely into the future.
Competition between banks for market share with other banks and with
nonbank financial institutions also has a way of eroding credit standards
cyclically.Furthermore,moral-hazard interventions by central banks (once
credit cycles go awry) have tended to lead to secular erosion of credit stan-
dards, as credit risk becomes increasingly socialized over time in order to
prevent financial instability from spilling over into larger economic dislo-
cations. Nowhere has this process of secular and cyclical credit-standard
erosion been more evident than in the innovative home loan financing cre-
ated during the recent expansion.
However, a quick look at key lines of credit extended to the household
sector suggests that household credit growth is already slowing, in spite of
the still high ratio of net worth to income. Home equity lending by com-
mercial banks,one of the primary conduits of mortgage equity withdrawal,
has come to a full stop (Figure 11).
The second major source of mortgage equity withdrawal for U.S.house-
holds has been the sales of existing houses.Mortgage applications for loans to
purchase houses have dropped considerably (Figure 12).The drop in the unit
volume of house sales, as well as company reports of plunging orders for
houses,confirms that this source of mortgage equity withdrawal has dried up.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21









Figure 11 Home Equity Loan Growth
















































Figure 12 Mortgage Loan Applications for Purchase Have Declined
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association  





















































































Figure 13 Consumer Loan Growth at All Commercial Banks 
Has Slowed
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Figure 14 Net Change in Credit Card Debt Has Slowed
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Another credit conduit—consumer bank loans that are not related to real
estate—has also all but dried up in the past year (Figure 13). Furthermore,
credit card usage has stepped down over the past three quarters as well
(Figure 14).
From the preceding facts, we can deduce that well before the pace of
U.S. economic growth and the pace of appreciation of U.S. household
portfolios were called into question, and well before banks signaled any
significant upward shift in risk perceptions and subsequently tightened
credit standards for loans to U.S. households (Figure 15), four key credit
conduits to the U.S. household sector had begun showing a noticeable
slowdown. According to Federal Reserve calculations as of the second
quarter of 2006,the pace of net mortgage equity withdrawal was $374 bil-
lion lower (at an annualized rate) than during the peak in the third quar-
ter of 2005. The Fed’s flow of funds data shows that the pace of net
increase in household liabilities dropped by $226 billion (at an annualized
rate) over the same period.Household credit growth is already slowing on
the back of the housing market contraction.
Based on these observations, the proposition that creditors will be
eager to finance a $600 billion or more annual pace of household deficit
spending predicated on a strong position of household net worth looks
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credit has been a demand-side response to slower appreciation in house
prices, and credit restrictions (which are supply-side driven and tend to be
much more abrupt and disruptive) have yet to appear on the scene.Should
a credit crunch or credit headwind appear from the supply side, however,
the above scenarios for a slowdown of consumer spending will prove overly
optimistic.
Summary and Conclusion
U.S. household deficit spending has achieved an alarming trajectory. So,
too, has the ratio of household debt to income. The two developments are
obviously related—deficit spending tends to lead to rising debt loads.
While debt-trap equations are frequently employed to analyze the sustain-
ability of European fiscal deficits or Latin American external deficits,rarely
are such analytical tools applied to private sector deficit spending.This bias
also persists despite the numerous financial-stability research departments
that have been established in various central banks, the International
Monetary Fund, and the Bank for International Settlements over the past
decade, with the goal of studying and anticipating these episodes.
In the case of household financial balances, the transformation of
macroeconomics back into a pre-Keynesian branch of aggregated micro-
economics has left economists predisposed to view household spending
decisions as intertemporal utility-maximization exercises (or as some
heuristic that delivers approximately the same result).From this viewpoint,
100 million or so U.S. consumers cannot be that wrong about their spend-
ing, saving, and balance sheet decisions.
Yet when a conventional debt-trap equation is applied to the U.S.
household sector, we find the presence of an explosive household debt-to-
income trajectory. The primary financial surplus is nearly exhausted, and
the long-run household income growth remains below the prevailing
interest rate on household debt. Accordingly, continued household deficit
spending has become increasingly dependent upon sustained asset price
appreciation in a Ponzi-like fashion. Under this dynamic, an explosive
household debt-to-income trajectory can be sustained only by an equally
explosive asset price appreciation that lifts asset prices far from fundamen-
tals. Central bankers, accordingly, may feel compelled to allow (if notThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 25
actively generate or support) serial asset bubbles in order to avoid violating
the lower threshold of their inflation target zones.6
Even under optimistic assumptions, the trajectory of U.S. household
spending growth is likely to slow further. With the end of the housing
boom, various major lines of household credit have already slowed dra-
matically, which suggests that the pace of household deficit spending is
likely to reverse course. If, as is typically the fashion, banks become con-
cerned with creditworthiness, as the slowdown unfolds, a credit crunch
could sharply curtail household credit growth and force a dramatic rever-
sal of household deficit spending.7
A stock-flow coherent macroeconomic model becomes especially use-
ful for tracing the implications of any significant change in the financial
balance of the U.S. household sector.8 Simply aggregating intertemporal
utility-maximizing equations for U.S.households will not do the trick.The
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, building on the work done by
Wynne Godley over the past decade, has simulated a number of possible
paths for the U.S. economy under different plausible assumptions about
sector financial balances.9
A stock-flow coherent approach reveals that a deceleration of consumer
deficit spending that is not offset by a combined acceleration of capital
spending, export growth, or fiscal stimulus will jeopardize U.S. profit and
economic growth,as well as the growth of countries dependent upon export-
led development strategies. Based on the analysis and evidence presented 
in this brief,the financial-balance scenarios developed by researchers at the
Levy Institute surely deserve serious examination by policymakers,investors,
and business leaders. A rendezvous with reality for U.S. household financial
imbalances appears to have arrived.It would be best to have an adequate map
in hand with which to anticipate and adequately prepare for the possible
repercussions.
Notes
1. The definition of the U.S. household financial balance that is used in
this analysis is derived from Table F.100 in the Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds Accounts of the United States.I take the difference between line 10
(gross saving and net capital transfers) and line 12 (capital expenditures).26 Public Policy Brief, No. 88
Some prefer to use the difference between line 5 (gross personal sav-
ing) and line 13 (residential investment) to avoid possible distortions
that may arise from relying on government estimates of depreciation
of household durable assets. The latter variant yields a first-quarter
2006 financing deficit of $806 billion. The definition of the household
financial balance that I use in the above analysis is the less alarming of
the two. I also chose to place the entire value of the statistical discrep-
ancy between the income and expenditure sides of the GDP accounts
into the financial-balance calculation for the business sector, rather
than split it between the business and household sectors. Since revi-
sions to estimates of profit income frequently swamp those of house-
hold sector income, this treatment seems sensible.
2. Most debt-trap equations used by the International Monetary Fund,
the European Central Bank,and others to identify the sustainability of
deficit spending and debt accumulation derive from E. D. Domar
(1944). Ironically, the austerity policies usually recommended by con-
temporary users of debt-trap equations are at odds with the conclu-
sions that Domar arrived at while he was exploring public finance
questions as an economist at the Fed.
3. From a sectoral financial-balance perspective,capital gains can be real-
ized in order to service debt only if the household sector can sell
appreciated assets to another sector. Unrealized capital gains can still,
however, provide the basis for the collateral needed to borrow more
from banks, and these borrowings can in turn be used in a Ponzi-
finance fashion to service prior debt obligations. When foreign
investor portfolio preferences strongly favor U.S. dollar-denominated
assets, or when the U.S. business sector is aggressively repurchasing
equities or retiring corporate debt, the realized capital gains loophole
from standard debt-trap equations will be available to the U.S. house-
hold sector. Notably, both of these conditions have been in place dur-
ing recent quarters.
4. Keynes (1936) coined this phrase while ruminating on possible long-
run outcomes. Keynes’s monetary theory of interest rate determina-
tion, and his understanding of the monetary policy strategies available
to central banks that are not chained to a fixed exchange-rate regime,
led him to believe that lower interest rates could be managed over time.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 27
To his credit, during World War II, both the United Kingdom and the
United States validated Keynes’s view. However, with the surge in
household sector debt service obligations as a percent of disposable
income (despite historically low nominal interest rates), a renaissance
of the rentier, rather than the predicted euthanasia, appears to have
played out in subsequent decades.
5. It is not clear that any plausible bond rally would be sufficient to off-
set home-price weakness, given the relative concentration of bond
holdings versus real estate holdings in the household sector. After all,
the distribution of wealth in various asset classes also matters when
assessing the effects of wealth on spending propensities.Assets that are
concentrated primarily in the top 1 percent of the income distribution
are likely to generate weaker wealth effects than more widely owned
assets (like real estate), if there is a lower marginal propensity to con-
sume at higher income levels.
6. In Epstein (2005),I provide a chapter describing the slippery slope the
Fed may have tread in this direction under former chairman Alan
Greenspan.
7. Note that none of this requires foreign private investors or foreign cen-
tral banks to boycott U.S. dollar–denominated assets or otherwise
dump existing holdings of U.S. dollar–denominated assets, which is
the prevailing scare story circulated in discussions of the resolution of
U.S. financial imbalances.
8. For one recent example of what macroeconomics looks like when it is
grounded in coherent stock-flow modeling with reasonable behavioral
assumptions, see Levy Institute Working Paper no. 421 by C. H. Dos
Santos and G. Zezza (2005). Lance Taylor, of New School University,
also has a long-standing tradition of working with compact social
accounting matrices to develop his structuralist macroeconomics
along stock-flow coherent lines.
9. See Papadimitriou et al. (2006) for a recent example of this financial
balance–based scenario work.28 Public Policy Brief, No. 88
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